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Abstract 
 
The equity risk premium puzzle has received regular attention by economists since it 
was first invoked by Mehra and Prescott (1985) twenty years ago. In a recent paper, 
they revisit the question and reject many of the explanations offered but we are left 
with no clear alternative account. The current paper seeks to do two things. We 
provide matching historical evidence of the equity premium for Australia and 
compare the results for the two nations. Resulting from this, we argue that a closer 
understanding of phases of economic history helps to explain the puzzle. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Twenty years ago Mehra and Prescott’s paper in the Journal of Monetary Economics 
brought to light the existence of the so-called equity premium puzzle. The ‘puzzle’, or 
paradox, lay in the wide gap between real returns to equity and to government bonds 
revealed by a longitudinal study of the United States over the course of nearly a 
century between 1889 and 1978.  Standard competitive equilibrium models suggested 
that, while an equity premium or gap should exist to reflect the greater risk associated 
with equity investment, this should converge to the order of one percentage point 
rather than the mean of six percentage points revealed by their historical research.2   
Mehra and Prescott’s work, while sceptically received at first, subsequently 
has received much attention in the economics literature. The focus has been on theory 
development and refinement in order to reconcile their quantitative empirical findings 
with economic analysis. Good summaries of the literature at different stages are 
provided by Kocherlakota (1996) and by Mehra and Prescott (2003).  Various strands 
of theory development can be identified. Of central importance has been discussion of 
investor preferences, market incompleteness, and anticipated versus actual returns.  
Investors may be subject to greater risk aversion than traditional modeling assumed, 
particularly as a result of habit formation. Asset markets suffer from friction 
particularly as a result of differentials in transactions costs and asymmetries in 
information. Significant differences may exist between ex ante expected returns and 
ex post results. 
 
 
2.  The Equity Premium in Australia 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that most of the literature on the equity 
premium puzzle has addressed conceptual and theoretical issues. There have been 
only limited attempts to look more closely at the historical data itself, calculations of 
the equity premium being mostly restricted to the United States or to the post-world 
War Two experience of several other similar manufacturing nations including France, 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan (Campbell 2003; Siegel 1994). In this briefing 
note, we calculate the equity premium for Australia across the same long run period 
as that of Mehra and Prescott for the United States. This provides us with an 
opportunity to draw comparisons of long term trends and shorter historical periods 
between two nations with distinctive economic structures. Australia’s emphasis upon 
the primary resource industries and a relatively active role for government contrasts 
with American laissez-faire industrial capitalism. 
The calculation of equity returns uses the same method as Mehra and Prescott, 
namely the holding return that incorporates dividend yields and changes in share 
prices. It draws upon Pope’s ‘all ordinaries’ indices for share prices and dividend 
yields, (which fortuitously covers almost exactly the same period as Mehra and 
Prescott) and then is price adjusted with Shergold’s GDP deflator. The results show a 
mean equity premium of 4.73 per cent covering the same period as the American data. 
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3.  Comparisons of Australia and the United States 
 
The decadal means are indicated in table one and figure one below, comparing 
Australia with the United States. 
 
 
 
Sources: USA: Mehra & Prescott (1985); Australia: Pope (1987); Shergold (1987) 
Note: The method of calculating the American equity premium is provided by 
Mehra and Prescott (1985). The Australian equity premium was calculated by initially 
summing the annual change in the share index with the dividend yield to produce the 
holding return. The bond yield was subtracted from this figure to achieve the nominal 
equity premium, which, in turn, was price adjusted with the Shergold deflator using 
the same base year (1972) as Mehra and Prescott. 
 
 
 
Table 1: The Mean Equity Premium in Australia
and the United States, 1889-1978
Australia USA
1889-98 3.01 1.78
1899-1908 8.82 5.08
1909-1918 3.90 1.49
1919-28 9.53 14.64
1929-38 1.77 0.18
1939-48 5.49 8.89
1949-58 3.93 18.3
1959-68 9.07 4.5
1969-78 -2.91 0.75
Mean 4.73 6.18
SD 4.04 6.49
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Figure 1: The Mean Equity Premium in Australia and the United States, 1889-1978 
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Sources: as per Table 1 
 
Several results are immediately apparent. Except for the 1950s, the trend is very 
similar between the two countries. However, the Australian mean premium over the 
century is nearly a quarter below that of the United States and the inter-decennial 
fluctuations are smaller and less volatile, as reflected in a much lower standard 
deviation. This suggests that cross investments between the two markets were 
relatively limited and were overlain by the existence of distinctive features for each 
capital market. Australia’s very different historical experience from the United States 
and the other key industrialized nations was as a small nation specializing in the 
resource industries. As price takers in notoriously volatile sectors, one might expect 
investors to be more risk averse in their investment strategies, thereby implying a 
larger equity premium as fewer moved to take advantage of asset return differentials.  
This is the logic behind the conceptual literature. It might alternatively be postulated 
that less demand for equity would constrain the growth of stock market prices and 
thus possibly the holding return to equity. Another empirical observation is that the 
Australian character would rarely be regarded as risk averse: gambling and hubris 
being more noticeable. This might suggest a greater willingness to invest in risky 
equity ventures. Successive investor booms in the highly speculative mining 
industries would tend to confirm this trait (Blainey 2003). In addition, official policy 
fostered risk-taking investment, including the ‘no-liability’ mining share, whereby an 
investor was not obliged to meet further unpaid calls. 
 In fact, there is probably limited value in deducing particular conclusions 
about means averaged across a century worth of data in light of the much more 
limited time perspective of the individual investor and the enormous changes in the 
business environment across the course of time. Instead, we should scrutinize more 
carefully the data for shorter periods. What is striking for the US data is that in only 3 
of the 9 decades is the equity premium above 5 per cent, and there are two clear 
outliers, 14.6 per cent for the 1920s and 18.3 per cent for the 1950s, which are more 
than double the mean; and in the latter case is triple the mean and more than double 
all the remaining decennial means. If we remove the two outliers the mean premium 
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of the remainder halves to 3.2 per cent. In the Australian case, outliers are less 
evident. However, if we remove the two highest figures, those above 9 per cent, the 
mean falls to a very similar 3.4.  If, alternatively, we remove the top 2 and bottom 2 
decennial means we get respectively 4.35 and 5.03 for USA and Australia. Thus, the 
American figure still fell noticeably from the original, while the Australian one 
actually rose marginally. This confirms the distinctive nature of two decades of 
American economic and business history, the 1920s and the 1950s, to the long term 
mean of the equity premium, or a range of other economic variables for that matter. 
Let us look briefly at the history of those two decades. 
 
 
4.  Phases of Economic History and the Equity Premium Paradox 
 
The 1920s were a decade of rapid growth and structural change in the American 
economy. It is during this period that the origins of the modern consumer economy 
can be most accurately dated. Household appliances (washing machines, refrigerators, 
vacuum cleaners) and a wide range of automobile models became available, and 
whose purchase was facilitated and sustained by the rapid expansion of consumer 
credit facilities. Companies that were quick to recognize this consumer revolution, 
such as General Motors, experienced exceptional prosperity. Other corporations, 
located particularly in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and electronics, established major 
research laboratories in the 1920s that generated new consumer products. These 
included Du Pont, Procter and Gamble, General Electric, and Westinghouse 
(Chandler 1990).  Many of these companies invested overseas in the 1920s and 1930s, 
providing benefits to local equity holders in other countries, though to a muted degree 
as demonstrated by the Australian equity premium figures, which peaked in the 
1920s.3 
The 1950s additionally provided exceptional growth opportunities for the 
American economy. At the end of World War Two, the United States was well placed 
to exploit the economic benefits of peace. Its erstwhile competitors in Western Europe 
and Japan had suffered major economic and political dislocation. The provision of 
Marshall Aid (European Recovery Programme) provided further opportunities for 
American exports and overseas investment on top of an already booming domestic 
economy (Milward 1984).  A range of new consumer industries, supported by 
sophisticated research and persuasive advertising, included television and air travel, 
while successive governments committed huge investments to economic 
infrastructure and military defence. By contrast, Australia performed badly in the 
early 1950s as the Korean War temporarily fuelled demand for wool exports. The 
collapse of the boom coincided with the adverse effects it had already had upon 
inflation and the international trade balance leading to a sharp contraction in output 
and in the stock market (Waterman 1972: 64-98). Some of this loss was made good, 
however, in the 1960s. 
The two decades of the 1920s and 1950s presented American investors with 
exceptional opportunities in light of the rapid growth of real dividends and stock 
prices (Grossman and Schiller 1981; Siegel 1994). However, inter-temporal changes 
in risk aversion, driven by habit formation, and the distinction between ex ante 
decisions and ex post returns explain why these opportunities were not effectively 
exploited by investors.  The post-World War Two decade had been preceded by a 
serious and sustained downturn in the American economy in the 1930s followed by 
the uncertainty, if not dislocation, created by the war. In these circumstances, 
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investors were likely to have become more risk averse than in other more stable 
periods of economic development. While the pre-1914 economic environment and 
that of World War One provided less grounds for risk averse responses, few could 
have imagined or predicted the remarkable economic expansion of the American 
economy in the 1920s.  In each case, the distinction between ex ante expectations and 
ex post returns would have been substantial. Frictions created by differences in 
transaction costs and imperfect information may have delayed an investor response; 
once it did come from the middle of the decade share prices were driven to 
unsustainably high levels and with it holding returns on equity and the equity 
premium (Mehra & Prescott, 2003: 897, 900). 
 
 
5.  What is a reasonable ‘wedge’ and how quickly might it converge? 
 
If the size of the equity premium in the 1920s and 1950s is explained by historical 
exceptionalism, are there grounds for accepting the residual long term figure of 3 to 4 
per cent as a reasonable ‘wedge’? Here we can turn to some further profitability 
evidence from Australian historical experience.  We would expect a gap between the 
return on equities and bonds both because of their varying risk profiles and because of 
any frictions in investors switching between different classes of asset. Equally, it 
would be reasonable to expect a much smaller wedge between investment returns in 
different equities, across industries or companies, because they belong to the same 
asset class and constitute similar levels of risk.  
 
Table 2. Comparative profitability by selected ANZSIC, 1920-38   [HERE] 
 
In a second set of Australian historical data, we have compared the returns to 
shareholders in different industries across the interwar period, organized upon the 
basis of the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification.4  This 
measures net profitability after taxes and depreciation as a percentage of shareholder 
funds on a price adjusted basis. The data is extracted from the Australian Investment 
Digest and includes approximately 500 companies per year. The results of the two 
best and worst performing ANZSIC categories are presented in table 2 below. The 
best performing sectors, manufacturing and utilities (electricity, gas, water), average 
8.2 per cent across the period, compared with 5 per cent for the worst two, wholesale 
trade and culture/ recreation, a gap of 3.2 per cent, or a proportionate difference in 
returns of more than 60 per cent.  Nor is there any evidence of convergence across 
two decades. Manufacturing was the best performer in the 1920s. Explanations for 
this include the influx of American multinationals, tariff policy, and cost-reducing 
innovations (Ville and Merrett). In work currently in progress, further disaggregation 
of manufacturing into distinct industries reinforces the existence of gaps and non-
convergence in rates of return. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
While the original theorizing on the basis of frictionless Arrow-Debreu type general 
equilibrium models suggested convergence in rates of return, excepting for a small 
risk premium across different asset types, the historical evidence paints a quite 
different picture of larger and more persistent differences. In their most recent 
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discussion of the topic, Mehra and Prescott (2003) acknowledge the importance of 
analyzing shorter run historical periods. We build on this approach.  The theoretical 
refinements offered to the original model help us to understand the exceptionalism of 
the 1920s and 1950s in America (ex ante decisions v ex post outcomes, and 
intertemporal shifts in risk aversion); they also aid our understanding of larger and 
more persistent differences than predicted, even within asset classes. Most likely, this 
can be attributed to incomplete markets and imperfect information. In these 
circumstances, premiums of 3 or 4 per cent in ‘normal’ periods may not be 
uncommon, with much larger gaps in exceptional periods. 
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Table 2. Comparative profitability by selected ANZSIC, 1920-38             
                    
ANZSIC Code 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 Mean 
Manufacturing 10.0 8.2 8.3 8.6 9.3 9.0 9.7 9.4 9.6 7.7 5.0 4.5 4.8 5.9 6.5 8.0 9.2 12.1 8.1 
Electricity, Gas, Water 8.1 8.6 8.9 9.6 8.9 8.6 9.2 8.9 9.7 9.0 8.7 8.1 8.1 7.8 7.0 7.0 6.8 7.2 8.3 
Wholesale Trade 11.7 7.9 5.4 4.0 6.1 6.9 7.4 6.8 7.4 3.2 -0.4 -2.1 0.9 3.4 3.7 5.9 7.1 9.1 5.2 
Cultural / Rec Services 3.0 8.1 6 5.4 6.0 8.4 7.9 8.9 5.0 6.7 3.6 0.7 1.4 3.1 2.6 3.6 5.2 3.0 4.9 
 
 
Source: Australian Investment Digest  
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2  In their most recent paper, Mehra & Prescott (2003) extend the data to 2000 leading to a 
slightly higher premium. This addition does not affect the arguments proffered in our paper. 
The Australian series on which we draw has not currently been extended through the 1980s 
and 1990s. A project to do so would motivate a related research topic – the degree of any 
equity premium convergence between nations in the light of recent capital market 
globalisation trends. 
3  Many American manufacturers established in Australia in the 1920s. Forster. 
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(DP 0557412) entitled, ‘Business Profitability and Long Term Industrial Change in Twentieth-
Century Australia’. Chief investigators are Professor David Merrett and Professor Simon 
Ville. Initial results for the interwar period have been published in Ville and Merrett (2005). 
 
 
 
